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When More Than Sorry Matters 
Lee Taft*  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Apology in the legal setting began gaining momentum in 1986, when 
Hiroshi Wagatsuma and Arthur Rossett published their seminal work on the 
implications of apologies in legal contexts.1  This interest exploded in the 
past decade partly because of the legislative movement to “protect” some 
forms of apology from traditional evidentiary rules.2  Under traditional evi-
dentiary rules, an apology could be ruled an admission against interest, mak-
ing it admissible as an exception to the rule against hearsay.  In 1999, when I 
first wrote on apology, only Massachusetts and Texas had statutes “protect-
ing” apologies from the traditional evidentiary rule;3 today, thirty-seven 
states have such statutes.4  Over the past ten years, scholars and commenta-
 
* This is an original but integrated article.  I have written several essays on apology and its repara-
tive qualities and have borrowed from those essays in this article.  Yet here I borrow from the theo-
retical discussions in the earlier essays; I do not concentrate on the themes addressed in earlier es-
says.  For those interested in exploring a deeper understanding of the healing possibilities of apology 
in mediated contexts, see Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE 
L.J. 1135 (2000); to consider how apology has the capacity to exacerbate a tort claimant’s suffering, 
see Lee Taft, On Bended Knee (With Fingers Crossed), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 601 (2006); for an essay 
on the role of apology in healthcare (more particularly the role of apology in the disclosure of unan-
ticipated outcomes in care), see Lee Taft, Apology and Medical Mistake: Opportunity or Foil?, 14 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 55 (2005); and for the potential legal dangers of coupling apology with disclo-
sure, see Lee Taft, Disclosure Danger: The Overlooked Case of the Cooperation Clause, 8 HARV. 
HEALTH POL’Y REV. 150 (2007).  I am grateful to Raija Churchill and Jory Canfield for their edito-
rial guidance, persistence, and commitment—to me and this important subject.  Any errors in this 
article are mine alone. 
 1. Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rossett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in 
Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 461 (1986). 
 2. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 408.  The legislative movement is being propelled by a movement 
in healthcare regarding the disclosure of unanticipated outcomes in patient care.  See infra p. 189 and 
accompanying notes. 
 3. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 233, § 23D (West 2008); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. § 18.061 (West 2008). 
 4. Anna C. Mastroianni et al., The Flaws in State “Apology” and “Disclosure” Law Dilute 
Their Intended Impact on Malpractice Suits, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Sept. 2010, at 1611 (2010). Three 
different evidentiary categories for apology have evolved in the state legislatures: (1) states like Ar-
kansas that adhere to the traditional evidentiary rule where an apology may also be an admission 
against interest; (2) states like Massachusetts and Texas where apologies have been granted partial 
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tors have debated the merits of these statutes, yielding a considerable body 
of scholarship beyond legislative considerations.  Today, apology has been 
analyzed in economic, biological, psychological, and moral terms.5  The util-
ity of apologyin both promoting settlement and keeping suits from being 
filed at allhas also been considered.6 
Mediated settings are fertile ground for reparative processes like apolo-
gy because parties often have opportunities for interactions that extend be-
yond the narrow conversations typically encouraged at the courthouse.  In 
mediation, especially interest-based mediation, parties have the opportunity 
to discuss moral and interpersonal obligations in addition to legal rights and 
remedies.  This openness creates space for parties to venture in apologetic 
discourse, a process that itself invites “forays into moral and emotional ex-
pression.”7  Anecdotal and empirical research find that some apologies posi-
tively influence claimants’ decisions regarding settlement, so that settlement 
is more likely after an apology is offered.8  Yet recent empirical research in-
dicates that there is both convergence and divergence on how claimants and 
lawyers interpret apologies.9  It is, then, no wonder that lawyers involved in 
mediation seekand needtraining on apology and on its place in resolv-
ing disputes. 
 
protection from evidentiary rules so that expressions of benevolence and sympathy are protected 
from the traditional rule, but expressions of fault or responsibility are not; and (3) states where the 
apologies of health care providers are granted complete immunity from traditional evidentiary rules 
so that both statements of sympathy and fault are protected as they are in states like Colorado.  See, 
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135 (2003). 
 5. See, e.g., Jonathan R.Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009 
(1999); Erin Ann O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH L. REV. 1121 
(2002); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 460 (2003); Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 
180 (2000); Taft, Apology Subverted, supra note 1.. 
 6. See, e.g., Lee Taft, Apology Within a Moral Dialectic: A Reply to Professor Robbennolt, 
103 MICH. L. REV. 1010 (2005); Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist 
Analysis into Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 221 (1999); Mi-
chael B. Runnels, Apologies All Around: Advocating Federal Protection for the Full Apology in Civ-
il Cases, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137 (2000). 
 7. Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1171 
(1997). 
 8. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 349 (2008). 
 9. Id. at 384. 
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II. FRAMEWORK 
A. Rationale 
It is critical for those involved in apologetic discourse to recognize that 
apology is not a monolithic concept.  Rather, it is a nuanced and contextually 
dependent expression informed by gender, religion, culture, and politics.  
What apology means to X may be different to Y.  To X, Z’s simple “I’m sor-
ry” may constitute an apology, while to Y, Z may need to couple “I’m sorry” 
with an unequivocal statement accepting responsibility.  X may not care 
whether Z is sincere in her apology: the words alone may be enough for X, 
while sincerity may be essential to Y.  These distinctions have been noted by 
legal scholars,10 yet to date, no uniform legal (or cultural) typology of apolo-
gy has been established.11  It is, then, important for those guiding apologies 
in mediated settings not to assume a shared understanding of what consti-
tutes an apology, but rather to determine what each party’s own understand-
ing of apology is and to then create a discourse that addresses apology as 
understood by the parties. 
B. Definitional Framework 
Sociologist Nicholas Tavuchis’s Mea Culpa is a seminal text on apolo-
gy.12  Tavuchis’s typology of apology distinguishes between authentic and 
inauthentic apologies.  To him, an authentic apology must follow a precise 
formula whereby the party offering the apology (1) acknowledges through 
speech the legitimacy of the violated rule, (2) admits fault for its violation, 
and (3) expresses genuine remorse and regret for the harm caused by the vio-
lation.13 
Recent legal scholarship differentiates between “partial” and “full” 
apologies.14  A partial apology is one in which the offending party expresses 
sympathy and hope for a rapid recovery, but does not accept responsibility 
 
 10. See, e.g., Brent T. White, Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights 
Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261 (2006) where White distinguishes between public and private 
apology and argues that words alone matter in a public apology.  Id. at 1295. 
 11. For the typology I have developed in my work, see infra note 21. 
 12. NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION 
(1991). 
 13. Id. at 3. 
 14. E.g., Robbennolt, supra note 5. 
3
Taft: When More Than Sorry Matters
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013
 184 
for the event causing the injury.15  A full apology includes the expression of 
sympathy contained in the partial apology and, importantly, adds an ac-
knowledgment of responsibility: “I am sorry you were hurt.  The accident 
was all my fault.  I was going too fast and not watching where I was going 
until it was too late.”16 
In contrast to the authentic or full apology, there is the botched apology.  
This is the apology that not only fails to effectively communicate the of-
fender’s remorse, but creates further harm that can strain relationships and 
fuel vengeance.17  Perhaps the most famous botched apology was offered by 
Richard Nixon: 
I regret deeply any injuries that may have been done in the course of 
the events that have led to this decision [to resign].  I would say on-
ly that if some of my judgments were wrong, and some were wrong, 
they were made in what I believed at the time to be in the best inter-
ests of the nation.18 
Nixon’s failure to acknowledge his offense, coupled with his assertion 
that he acted for the greater good, made this a botched apology.  It is the 
kind of apology those of us living in the United States have become used to 
hearing from politicians and from other public figuresthe kind of apology 
destined to invite impasse if launched in a mediated setting. 
The most common explanation for a botched or failed apology is the of-
fender’s pride, which acts as a wall between the offensive act and the feeling 
of shame for having violated social norms.19  This wall of pride is a psycho-
logically driven defensive strategy, designed to protect against negative feel-
ings associated with knowing one has caused harm to another through negli-
gence, incompetency, or ethical lapse.  It is the confrontation a person 
experiences when his behavior contradicts his self perception—the loss of 
“face” he experiences when his view of his competency, intelligence, or mo-
rality does not match his behavior.20  Aversion to seeing one’s behavior 
truthfully explains why apologies are so often expressed in language like “I 
am sorry you were hurt,” instead of “I am sorry I hurt you.” 
Understanding how easy it is to botch an apology and seeing our incli-
nation to avoid authentic apologies point to the moral dimension of apology.  
Authentic apology requires the person who violated a social norm to 
 
 15. Id. at 484 n.12. 
 16. Id. 
 17. AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY (2004). 
 18. Aaron Lazare, Go Ahead and Say You’re Sorry, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 40. 
 19. Id. at 76 (quoting President Nixon’s resignation speech of August 8, 1974). 
 20. See Brent T. White, Saving Face: The Benefits of Not Saying I’m Sorry, 72 LAW AND 
CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 261, 264 (2009); Taft, Apology Subverted, supra note 1 at 1141. 
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acknowledge the breach of that norm, to accept responsibility for that 
breach, and to communicate sorrow for the harm caused.  The person who 
apologizes must hurdle the barriers of fear and pride that protect “face” and, 
at the same time, subject himself to the consequences that flow from accept-
ing responsibility for the harm caused.  When the difficulty of apology is 
consideredalong with the strength and courage that its performance re-
quiresit becomes clear that apology is indeed a moral activity, one moral 
simply in its expression.  That is, the offering of an authentic apology is it-
self a moral act, regardless of its efficacy. 
It is important, then, for those guiding apologetic discourse to distin-
guish between types of apologies21 and to recognize the markers of a 
botched apology.  It is especially important to note that the botched apology 
will likely exacerbate tensions between the parties.  A misfired apology 
hampers negotiation and invites impasse.  As discussed below, if the party 
who caused harm cannot overcome the barriers to communicating an authen-
tic apology, it may be more prudent to issue none at all.22 
 
 21. I typologize apologies as follows. 
Legal Categories (objective): 
1. Full apology: an apology in which the party offering the apology accepts legal respon-
sibility for both the harm caused and the suffering tied to that harm; 
2. Partial apology: an apology in which the party offering the apology expresses sympa-
thy for the suffering another has endured but does not accept legal responsibility for the 
harm caused. 
Moral Categories (subjective): 
1. Authentic apology: the party offering the apology is sincere in his remorse and the 
apology offered is informed and propelled by that sincere remorse.  It is an apology 
prompted by an inner desire to account for harm caused. 
2. Inauthentic apology: the party offering the apology is motivated by the utility of apol-
ogy and its capacity to manipulate the party receiving the apology.  It is an apology 
prompted by an inner desire to manipulate another’s experience, perception, choice, or a 
combination of these three. 
Failed/Botched Apologies: an apology that misfires for any number of reasons (failure of 
party to accept responsibility, failure in semantics, etc.). 
It is important to note that the objective legal category and the subjective moral category can be 
mixed and matched.  For example, a full apology can be either authentic or inauthentic depending on 
the subjective intention of the offeror.  That is, X can accept legal responsibility for the harm caused, 
but do so because of a desire to manipulate Y, so that Y might accept less compensation.  This 
would be a full inauthentic apology.  As White notes, the authenticity may or may not matter to Y.  
See Brent T. White, supra note 10.  Any of these apologies can also be protected so that it cannot be 
used as evidence of legal liability.  See infra pp. 186–89. 
 22. See infra p. 189. 
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It is also important to recognize that apology is not usually an end in it-
self.  Instead, it is a piece of a larger reparative process, a process some have 
described as a redemptive sequence beginning with transgression and ending 
in redemption.23  For others it is the centerpiece of rituals designed to humil-
iate and shame.24  For me, apology is the voice of a reparative ritual within a 
larger reconciliation sequence, a sequence beginning with harm and ending 
in reconciliation. 
C. Reconciliation Model 
Modern tort law is rooted in the legal system’s search for an alternative 
to the blood feud.25  In blood feud cultures, rituals were created to resolve 
disputes, “elaborate ceremonies of reconciliation and peacemaking.”26  If 
X’s misconduct triggered a feud with Y, the ceremony might end with X 
having to lay his head on Y’s knee and plead with Y to give it back.27  In this 
culture, there was an inseparable link between apology, compensation, and 
forgiveness. 
As an alternative to the blood feud, modern tort law is only an experi-
mentwhat has been called a “civilizing effort.”28  Yet within our elaborate 
system of compensation, rituals of reconciliation and peacemaking have all 
but disappeared.  When cases are settled, we have no elaborate displays in-
viting reconciliation.  A driver who has killed another does not lay her head 
on the knee of the surviving spouse and beg for her head.  Doctors do not 
kneel before a patient and beg for forgiveness.29  This civilizing effort ex-
tends beyond the tort system.  There is no legal ritual for an unfaithful 
spouse to amend for moral lapse, so families squander fortunes acting out 
vengeance in courtrooms across the country.  Somewhere in this civilizing 
effort we have forgotten the importance of ritual, and in our forgetfulness an 
essential human need has been lost.  Collaborative processes offer an oppor-
tunity for correction. 
 
 23. Danielle Celermajer, Apology and the Possibility of Ethical Politics, J. OF CULTURAL & 
RELIGIOUS THEORY, Winter 2008, at 14. 
 24. WILLIAM IAN MILLER, FAKING IT 77–78 (2003); see also infra pp. 6–7. 
 25. Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 
40 (1994). 
 26. Miller, supra note 24, at 85. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Shuman, supra note 25, at 40. 
 29. There is a growing movement within healthcare that encourages physician transparency in 
the wake of preventable medical error.  This movement is the disclosure movement discussed in 
more detail in Section IV.A. 
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Reparative rituals have received little attention in legal literature.  Even 
in the apology literature, scholars only infrequently attempt to locate apolo-
gy within larger reparative processes.  Here, I offer one model for the reader 
to consider.  The desired end point of the model I present is reconciliation.  
It is important for the reader to note that another writer might desire a pro-
cess ending in humiliation. 
A few years ago, I was presenting a lecture at Southern Methodist Uni-
versity, and Justice Albie Sachs of the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
was in the audience.  The lecture was a critique of the protected apology in 
which I argued that protecting apologies from evidentiary rules has the po-
tential to subvert the moral integrity of apology, turning an authentic expres-
sion into a strategic act.30  Sachs said that he did not care whether the apolo-
gy was protected or not; what mattered to him was that the apology brought 
his enemy to bended knee.31 
During the lecture I offered no response to Sachs’s argument in favor of 
protecting apologies.  I could not imagine that this freedom fighter would 
value an apology offered behind closed doors, one known to him and no one 
else, and so I was atypically quiet when he concluded his remarks.  It was 
only after the lecture that I understood what Sachs intended and I experi-
enced a kind of esprit de l’escalier.  He was not arguing in favor of the se-
crecy of apology; rather, he was arguing against the idea that its sincerity 
mattered.32  To him, the value of the apology rested in its utterance, not in 
his enemy’s changed heart.  The goal for Sachs was humiliation, not recon-
ciliation. 
Still, there is resonance between Sachs’s and my views.  We both want 
the apology to have meaning to the parties.  For Sachs, the meaning of the 
apology is that it signals surrender: the apology brings Sachs victory and 
brings his enemy to bended knee.  For me, the meaning of the apology is 
that, in its full and authentic expression, it has the capacity to restore moral 
balance between the parties—moral restoration that invites healing and rec-
onciliation.  For both Sachs and me, then, there is the potential for apology 
to have great efficacy. 
I pause here to highlight a bias, which may already be apparent, yet one 
of sufficient importance to warrant an explicit acknowledgment.  I am a pro-
 
 30. See also supra note 21. 
 31. Justice Sachs’s perspective captures another aspect of “face.”  See supra at 4.   From his 
perspective it is essential that the offender suffer face damage, especially the humiliation of having 
to appeal to the victim on bended knee.  See also White, supra note 10. 
 32. See infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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ponent of the full, authentic, and unprotected apology.  In the wake of seri-
ous harm, I find “I’m sorry” an insufficient basis for forgiveness, reconcilia-
tion, or both.  I have worked with men who have battered their domestic 
partners, and I have come to distrust superficial expressions like “Baby, I’m 
sorry” as the basis for the battered spouse to resume relationship.  If I had 
been battered I would need something more than “I’m sorry.”  I would need 
evidence that the apology offered was reliable, that the expressed remorse 
was coupled with reliable evidence of changed behavior.  For me, something 
more than “I’m sorry” is needed to effect meaningful reconciliation.33 
Little attention has been paid to what is meant by or required for recon-
ciliation.  For example, the Texas ADR statute defines mediation as “a fo-
rum in which an impartial person, the mediator, facilitates communication 
between the parties to promote reconciliation, settlement, or understanding 
between them.”34  Yet the statute does not define reconciliation.  In legal 
scholarship, reconciliation is sometimes conflated and confused with the re-
lated reparative processes of repentance and forgiveness.35  While this may 
not matter in theoretical contexts, it is essential that those facilitating repara-
tive processes understand the distinct movements in a reconciliation se-
quence and understand the interrelationship among them, if the needs of 
those at the table are to be truly served. 
Overview 
A need for reconciliation suggests that something has been broken and 
that there is a need to repair that brokenness, so something new can come 
 
 33. I would need the batterer to demonstrate that the apology was both full and authentic.  See 
supra note 21, regarding the typologies of apology.  This means that the batterer would accept full 
responsibility for having caused harm and accept the legal consequences as a result of his having 
caused that harm.  This would provide objective evidence of the apology’s reliability.  Yet, I would 
also want to know that the batterer was authentically remorseful for his behavior, that he was himself 
committed to behavioral correction so that the conduct was not likely to be repeated.  He would need 
to be committed to interventions such as anger management, talk therapy, empathy training, etc.  
That is, he would be committed deeply to becoming a different person by embracing the process of 
repentance described infra pp. 18486. 
 34. TEX. REM. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.023 (West 1999). 
 35. See, e.g., W. Jonathan Cardi, Damages As Reconciliation, 42 LOYOLA L.A.L. REV. 5, 10 
(2008).  Here Cardi defines reconciliation in a narrow way.  For him, to reconcile is “to accept or be 
resigned to something not desired.”  Id.  To him, reconciliation consists of letting go of negative 
emotions, a process most experts would understand as an essential part of the related but independ-
ent process of forgiveness.  Yet, most critically, Cardi states that reconciliation does not “require the 
resumption of trust or any personal relationship with the other party going forward.”  Id. at 11.  In 
my understanding, the hallmark of reconciliation is restored relationship and a willingness to risk 
trust. 
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into being.  In a recent article, one legal scholar borrowed from Aristotle in 
conceptualizing the purpose of reconciliation as a process to restore the par-
ties to a “pre-wrong equilibrium.”36  That may be a helpful conceptualization 
in stranger litigation, but it is an unambitious goal for those participating in 
collaborative processes.37  Collaborators recognize that in the wake of seri-
ous harm there is no going back to a past normal; the parties seek a forward 
looking process to help them find a new normal.  One of the gifts of collabo-
rative processes is helping people bring that new normal into being. 
In the reconciliation model I developed, the sequence is: 
 
Harmful event > repentance > forgiveness > reconciliation 
 
Illustrated, the process looks like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the wake of harm, the party causing harm is invited to account for the 
harm caused through a secular adaptation of the religious process of repent-
ance.  Repentance authentically performed will, according to recent data, 
positively influence forgiveness in seventy-six percent of cases.38  This is not 
to suggest that X’s forgiveness of Y depends on Y’s repentance.  For-
 
 36. Id. at 19. 
 37. Stranger litigation is litigation between strangers, like two strangers who collide in an in-
tersection.  Collaborative processes usually occur between parties known to each other, where the 
relationship itself matters, as between family members or members of a church or community. 
 38. WILLIAM WILMOT & JOYCE HOCKER, INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT 311 (7th ed. 2007). 
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giveness is an individual and sometimes unilateral process.  X can choose to 
forgive Y regardless of any action on Y’s part.  The data are offered to illus-
trate how repentance can influence and facilitate forgiveness, and to show 
the relationship between the movements in the reconciliation sequence dis-
cussed here. 
Just as there is a relationship between repentance and forgiveness, there 
is also a relationship between forgiveness and reconciliation.  As just noted, 
forgiveness is an individual (and sometimes unilateral) experience.  It is 
solely the prerogative of the party harmed.  That is, forgiveness should not 
be vicariously offered or directed.  Nor should it be coerced or imposed.  It 
is not necessarily relational.  X can choose to forgive Y and choose not to 
resume a relationship with Y.  In fact, when Y has not authentically repent-
ed, forgiveness without reconciliation may be the wisest choice.39 
The essential quality of reconciliation is relationship.  That is, reconcili-
ation is relational if nothing else; it is the restoration of relationship where 
the party harmed is willing to risk trust.  In the absence of engagement with 
another, reconciliation is a non sequitur.  Yet meaningful reconciliation de-
pends on forgiveness preceding it.  Without forgiveness, X and Y may ap-
pear reconciled. Yet in reality, without forgiveness, they have constructed 
only a superficial peace: the political peace we witness in our war-torn 
world, the kind of peace that fractures when the slightest stress is next im-
posed.  Forgiveness creates the space for reconciliation, where a new normal 
can be constructed.  This new space holds the possibility of transforming the 
chaos generated by harm into peace.  
In summary, harm invites the party causing harm to repent; repentance 
authentically performed  inspires forgiveness; and forgiveness opens the 
door for reconciliation.  Forgiveness can be experienced regardless of 
whether the party causing the harm repents or not and regardless of whether 
or not reconciliation occurs; that is, forgiveness can be a singular, non-
relational experience.  In contrast, reconciliation is a relational reparative 
movement, by definition dyadic and conditioned on the granting of for-
giveness.  Because this is an article on apology, I will now turn to a more 
focused discussion of apology and its role within the process of repentance. 
Repentance 
I am sometimes asked why I use the word repentance when most of my 
work occurs in secular contexts.  After all, repentance is, for many, a heavily 
freighted religious concept.  I am told that using that word distracts some 
people from the process it represents.  My response is that I know of no oth-
 
 39. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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er word in the lexicon that so accurately describes what I think is required of 
a party who has caused harm to help the party harmed heal.  Outside of 
twelve step programs, there is no well developed understanding in the secu-
lar civil culture of what is required of X to mend what she has broken, and 
even twelve-step models frequently miss the mark.  Because religious com-
munities have long concerned themselves with mending brokenness, I bor-
row from the wisdom that religious traditions have developed around re-
pentance and adapt it to the work I do.40 
The religious concept of repentance “unites two linguistic and theologi-
cal traditions, by combining the Greek metanoia with the Hebrew shuv.”41  
Metanoia suggests a fundamental change in mind the same way that meta-
morphosis suggests a fundamental change in form.42  Shuv is a Hebrew root 
word meaning “to turn” or “to return,” as to turn away from behaviors that 
cause harm.  The elements of repentance are remorse, explanation, apology, 
accommodation, and restructuring or lessons learned. 
Apology is then an integral part of repentance: it is the voice of repent-
ance.  As the voice of repentance, it communicates remorse and offers ex-
planation.43  It can promise accommodation and new behavior.  While there 
are some circumstances where an injured party seeks apology as the primary 
accommodation,44 apology itself is usually not the only accommodation 
sought and is not itself evidence of new behavior.  An apology should in-
clude an acknowledgment of harm done; acknowledgment is an important 
step in healing harm.  Yet in the wake of harm, more than remorse, explana-
tion, and acknowledgment are needed.  This is why I distinguish between 
apology and repentance, as a chemist might distinguish between oxygen and 
water. 
 
 40. In my recent work I sometimes use the word accountability in place of repentance, particu-
larly if I have concern that the word repentance will itself distract the parties from focusing on the 
elements within the process.  Still, when I use the word accountability I define it as containing the 
same five elements that define repentance: remorse, explanation, apology, accommodation, and les-
sons learned. 
 41. Malcolm David Eckel, A Buddhist Approach to Repentance, in REPENTANCE: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 129 (Amitai Etzioni & David E. Carney eds., 1997) (citing 
THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 978 (Gerard Kittel ed., 1967)). 
 42. Id. 
 43. If explanation crosses a line and becomes justification, the communication is no longer an 
apology but becomes instead an apologia.  See Taft, Apology and Medical Mistake, supra note 1, at 
70–71. 
 44. See, e.g., White, supra note 10.  See also discussion supra p. 7. 
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Over the past several years, a variety of studies have examined the effi-
cacy of apologies in health care settings.  Studies suggest that, after apology, 
many “meritorious claims tend to drop out of the pool.”45  Results like these 
are celebrated.  They provide impetus for many studies examining the pre-
cise kinds of apologies that will be most effective in influencing the party 
harmed to forgo litigation.  In fact, researchers now assume claimants will 
forgo or, at the very least, accept less than full compensation for an injury if 
an apology is offered.46  Indeed, there is almost a cry of surprise among 
those investigating the efficacy of apology when they observe that, even 
when victims accept apologies, they may still require compensation.47 
This trend should alarm claimants and their lawyers.  It describes a 
transaction in which a patient is first physically injured by medical er-
rorand then financially injured when language is used to manipulate the 
patient into relinquishing an otherwise meritorious claim.  This trend de-
scribes what can occur when a moral movement is launched instrumentally, 
when an apology is accepted in lieu of repentance, and when an element is 
mistaken for the substance of which it is only one part.48 
Yet the trend also points to the power of apology to disrupt traditional 
litigation cyclesa trend that has inspired a national legislative movement 
to protect apologies from traditional evidentiary rules. 
III.  LEGISLATION 
A. History 
In the 1970s, a Massachusetts legislator’s daughter was killed while rid-
ing her bicycle.  The driver who struck her never apologized.  Her father, a 
state senator, was angry that the defendant never expressed contrition.  Lat-
er, the senator was told that the driver did not apologize because of his fear 
that an apology could be construed as an admission in litigation around the 
girl’s death.  To overcome this barrier, the senator and his successor crafted 
a statute to create a safe harbor for apologies.49  This statute was approved 
by the Massachusetts legislature on December 24, 1986, and became the first 
apology statute in the country.50  It made inadmissible as an admission of li-
 
 45. Erin Ann O’Hara, Apology and Thick Trust: What Spouse Abusers and Negligent Doctors 
Might Have in Common, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 1079 (2004). 
 46. O’Hara & Yarn, supra note 5, at 1179. 
 47. Id. at 1175. 
 48. This trend shows the underbelly of the full, inauthentic apology.  See supra note 21. 
 49. Taft, Apology Subverted, supra note 1, at 1151. 
 50. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233 § 23D (West 1986). 
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ability any “statements, writings or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy 
or a general sense of benevolence relating to pain, suffering or death of a 
person involved in an accident.”51 
The next state to pass an apology statute was Texas, when it passed 
what the Austin American-Statesman dubbed the “I’m sorry” bill in 1999.52  
Like the Massachusetts bill, the Texas statute protected expressions of sym-
pathy and benevolence from evidentiary rules.  Unlike Massachusetts, the 
Texas statute explicitly excludes from the statute’s protection “a communi-
cation, including an excited utterance . . . which also includes a statement or 
statements concerning negligence or culpable conduct pertaining to an acci-
dent or event.”53  California and Florida quickly followed by enacting stat-
utes similar to the Texas statute, in which statements of fault are explicitly 
excluded from the statute’s protection.54 
B. Today 
Today, thirty-seven states have apology statutes.55  The legislative trend 
is to expand protection given to apologies, particularly those of health care 
providers.  Some states, like Colorado and Oklahoma, protect both expres-
sions of benevolence and fault if the apology is offered in a health care con-
text.56  Oregon’s statute is the most sweeping.  It protects any statement by 
someone licensed by the Oregon Board of Medical Examiners, regardless of 
the context in which the statement is offered.57 
C. Implications in ADR Settings 
Apologies thus fall within three general evidentiary categories, depend-
ing on what state governs their admissibility.  There are states that have not 
enacted apology statutes, where an apology’s admissibility will be deter-
mined under general rules regarding exceptions to the hearsay rule.  There 
are states that offer partial protection for apologetic expressions of sympathy 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Sorry’s Safe Now, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, July 2, 1999, at A14. 
 53. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (West 1999). 
 54. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160(a) (West 2000); FLA. STAT. § 90.4026(2) (2001). 
 55. See supra note 5. 
 56. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135 (West 2003); OKLA. STATE. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1H 
(2004). 
 57. OR. REV. STATE. § 677.082 (2003). 
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and benevolence, as Massachusetts and Texas do.  And there are states that 
offer full protection for the apologies of physicians, like Colorado and Okla-
homa, which protect both expressions of sympathy and fault. 
In many states such as Texas, the only truly safe harbor for offering a 
fault-admitting apology is in a mediated setting, because of the protections 
granted to communications in ADR settings.58  This means that collaborative 
settings are potentially ideal places for the party who causes harm to offer a 
fault-admitting apology, without fear that the apology can later be used as an 
admission.  Yet the claimant and her counsel must evaluate the quality of an 
apology offered in this protected setting.  Both its legal and moral content 
must be considered and its reparative value weighed.59 
For some claimants, the sincerity of an apology may not matter.60  Some 
claimants may not care if an apology is offered strategically or for instru-
mental purposes.  Some may not care that an apology offered in a safe har-
bor cannot be later be used in court if the collaborative process fails.  Some 
may not consider apology within a sequence of reconciliation as I do here; 
some may not consider apology within a moral dialectic.  Some may not 
hunger for an apology at all.  For some, forgiveness and reconciliation are 
not among the desired outcomes of the process, or if they are, they are con-
sidered independently of the other party’s accounting for the harm caused. 
Yet there are those who hunger for apologypeople for whom for-
giveness and reconciliation are conditioned on authentic repentance, includ-
ing an unprotected apology.  There are people for whom the moral dimen-
sion of apology matterspeople who will not accept an apology offered in a 
safe harborpeople who will insist that if the offending party is sorry they 
will say so without the protections the harbor offers. 
There is no singular or right way to view apology or its role (if any) in 
reparative processes.  What is essential is that all involved are aware of the 
evidentiary rules governing apology.  In an ADR setting, X must know that 
Y’s apology is protected, and there must be agreement with the legitimacy of 
that protection.  As X’s counsel, it is my responsibility to advise X of the 
limits of a communication offered within a safe harbor.  I must disabuse X 
of the idea that if the process fails, Y’s admission is of evidentiary value in 
the ensuing litigation.  As counsel for X, I may seek an agreement to remove 
 
 58. Although the timing of an apology is outside the scope of this article, the reader should be 
aware that timing is itself a complicated issue.  Some would suggest that waiting to offer an apology 
at mediation might be too late since some apologies are time sensitive, while others suggest that the 
dispute itself needs time to metamorphose.  See, e.g., Michael B. Rainey et al., For Practical and 
Legal Reasons, An Apology When Things Go Awry Is a Good Idea, but Beware of the Dangers, 26 
ALTERNATIVES 115, 116 (2008).  I employ the maxim “better late than early.” 
 59. See supra note 21. 
 60. See White supra note 10; see also supra p. 7. 
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the apology from ADR’s safe harbor, as a negotiated apology that has full 
evidentiary import. 
As Y’s counsel, I must explore the ethical dimensions of any apology 
offered as well as the legal privileges that attach because of the location in 
which it is offered.  If X seeks an unprotected apology, I must explain the 
legal consequences of offering an unprotected apology in unequivocal terms 
to Y. 
Regardless of whether I represent X or Y, I must use care to be sure that 
my client’s interest is what is being negotiated, and not persuade a client to 
exchange his perspective for mine.  And, as outlined below, it is important 
that all concerned recognize that apology sometimes attains different values 
for lawyers and clients.61 
IV. EMPIRICAL DATA 
Most of the early reports suggesting that apologies positively influence a 
claimant’s decision to settle were anecdotal, and most of those observations 
were made in the healthcare context.  Today, researchers have conducted 
empirical research supporting the anecdotal observations: “apologies influ-
ence claimant’s perceptions, judgments, and decisions in ways that are likely 
to make settlement more likely . . . .”62  In 2008, a study empirically exam-
ined how lawyers reacted to apology.  In this section, I offer a brief review 
of the literature. 
A. Impact of Apology for Claimants 
In 1999, a study published by the Institute of Medicine titled To Err is 
Human found that up to 100,000 people die each year because of preventa-
ble medical mistakes.63  In 2001, the Joint Commission, the organization that 
accredits hospitals, responded by requiring that patients be informed of all 
unanticipated outcomes in the patient’s care, including adverse outcomes 
and those resulting from medial error.64  The communication in which a pa-
 
 61. See infra, pp. 192–94. 
 62. Robbennolt, supra note 8, at 350. 
 63. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 26 (Linda T. 
Kohn et.al., eds., Nat’l Acad. Press 1999). 
 64. JOINT COMM’N ON THE ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., HOSPITAL 
ACCREDITATION STANDARDS (2004), Standard RI.2.90.  It is important to note that while this is the 
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tient is informed of an unanticipated outcome is called a disclosure.  For 
most hospitals and providers, in spite of long-existing ethical mandates to 
communicate openly with patients,65 the transparency disclosure required 
was new, and there was fear that disclosure would prompt claims and in-
crease litigation and expenses.  Yet there were a few bold hospitals that had 
already launched disclosure processes, and the experience of those systems 
and many since offer a very different picture. 
For example, the University of Michigan began a proactive disclosure 
program designed and implemented by lawyer Rick Boothman in 1997, 
years before disclosure was imposed by the Joint Commission.  When an in-
vestigation determined that an adverse outcome was the result of medical 
error, Boothman’s team did not engage in traditional defend and deny strate-
gies.  Instead, the medical team followed a proactive and transparent plan.  
The patient was advised of the error, a fault-admitting apology was offered, 
and a fair offer of accommodation was made.  By 2007, the number of pend-
ing lawsuits against the University was down by fifty percent, legal expenses 
were cut in half, and expenses dropped from $48,000 per claim in 1997 to 
$21,000 per claim in 2003.66 
An example of a program implemented after the Joint Commission is-
sued its regulation is that of the Stanford University Medical Center.  Sever-
al years ago, I was asked to help Stanford develop an innovative and patient-
centered intervention in the wake of an unanticipated outcome in patient 
care.  The program we developed is called PEARL, an acronym for the Pro-
cess for the Early Assessment and Resolution of Loss.  PEARL creates dis-
tinct processes for providers to follow depending on whether the unantici-
pated outcome experienced by the patient is a result of preventable medical 
error.  When the event is the result of preventable medical error, the disclo-
sure is coupled with an evidentiary-binding, fault-admitting apology.  In 
 
first regulatory requirement, disclosure has long been ethically mandated by professional organiza-
tions.  See, e.g., American Medical Ass’n Code of Professional Ethics E-8.12. 
 65. E.g., AMA Code of Professional Ethics, E-8.12. 
 66. Allen Kachlia et. al., Liability Claims and Costs Before and After Implementation of a 
Medical Error Disclosure Program, 153 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 213, 215–17 (2010); see also 
Richard C. Boothman, Transparency: The Benefits of an Open and Honest Dialogue (presented at 
State Bar of Michigan Audio Conference, Apr. 25, 2006).  Similar positive results have been noted 
outside of a healthcare setting.  In 1991, the TORO Company was paying out more than $17 million 
per year in claims.  Then, in 1991, TORO instituted a proactive claims management strategy, which 
included offering a fault-admitting apology when TORO was culpable for the harm caused and, like 
Michigan, a fair offer of accommodation.  By 2004, TORO was paying out only $4.3 million per 
year in claims, and, notably, had not tried a lawsuit since 1994.  Patricia Panchak, Product Liability--
Pro-Active Protection, INDUSTRYWEEK (Oct,18,2005),  
http://www.industryweek.com/regulations/product-liability-pro-active-protection (confirmed by au-
thor in conversation with TORO risk manager Drew Byers). 
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2011, Stanford published the results of the fifty PEARL claims reported 
from September 1, 2007 through February 28, 2011.  The results mirrored 
those at the University of Michigan: claim frequency was down by thirty-six 
percent and costs had been slashed.67 
These kinds of results make perfect sense when considered in light of 
recent research regarding patient desires after medical mistakes.  A study on 
patient attitudes regarding medical errors found that patients wanted to be 
told about all errors that caused harm, and, critically, wanted a full apology 
following medical error.68  Indeed, Mediator Chris Hyman reports that in her 
study, ten of eleven medical negligence cases settled when the defendant 
doctor offered an apology, as contrasted with three of eight cases settling 
when no apology was offered.69 
In 2003, Jennifer Robbennolt, now Professor of Law and Psychology at 
the University of Illinois, conducted a study to determine how apology af-
fects a claimant’s decision to settle.70  Robbennolt’s study participants visit-
ed a website in order to read an accident scenario.71  It was a fairly simple 
scenario: a pedestrian was struck by a bicyclist and was injured.  The partic-
ipants were assigned the role of the injured party and then asked to evaluate 
the settlement offer.  Robbennolt introduced numerous control variables into 
this two-party study, which enabled her to monitor how different kinds of 
apologies impacted settlement. 
Robbennolt distinguished between a full and partial apology in her eval-
uation.  Where a partial apology expresses only sympathy and a full apology 
includes both sympathy and acceptance of responsibility.72  This is the dif-
ference between “I am sorry you were hurt” and “I am sorry you were hurt.  
The accident was my fault.  I was going too fast and not watching where I 
was going until it was too late.”73  The full apology positively influenced set-
tlement seventy-three percent of the time.  Importantly, no apology was 
more effective than a partial apology: fifty-two percent of cases settled with 
 
 67. INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, RESPECTFUL MANAGEMENT OF SERIOUS 
CLINICAL ADVERSE EVENTS, Appendix E (2d ed. 2011). 
 68. See Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients’ and Physicians’ Attitudes Regarding Disclosure 
of Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001 (2003). 
 69. Chris S. Hyman & Clyde B. Schechter, Mediating Medical Malpractice Lawsuits Against 
Hospitals: New York City’s Pilot Project, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1394, 1395 (2006). 
 70. Robbennolt, supra note 5. 
 71. Id. at 491. 
 72.  See supra pp. 178–79. 
 73. Robbennolt, supra note 5, at 484 n.112. 
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no apology and a fair offer, as compared to thirty-five percent settling after a 
partial apology.74 
More recently, Robbennolt summarized recent research on how apolo-
gies impact the decision to settle.75  She noted that apologies positively in-
fluence two identified settlement levers: aspirations and judgments regarding 
fair settlement values.76  That is, people receiving an apology were more 
likely to set lower values on both levers.  She also noted that people receiv-
ing a full apology “judged an offer as being more adequate, felt less need to 
punish the other party . . . were more willing to forgive” and more likely to 
accept a particular settlement offer.77 
B. Impact of Apology on Lawyers 
In Robbennolt’s 2008 study, she evaluated the effect of apology on law-
yers.  This is an important contribution, not only because of lawyers’ pres-
ence in collaborative processes, but also because of the influence lawyers 
can exert on their clients.  In this study, Robbennolt repeated the fact scenar-
io outlined above.78  Lawyers were asked to assume they represented the in-
jured client and to give their reservation prices, aspirations, and assessments 
on fair settlement value.  So that the effect of an apology could be evaluated, 
the nature of the apology offered (full versus partial) was varied.  Addition-
ally, participants were asked to assume different evidentiary standards for 
the apology offered, so that in one scenario the apology was protected and in 
others it was not.  Finally, the evidence was manipulated so that in one sce-
nario the cyclist was clearly at fault and, in another, fault was less clear.79 
In the wake of a full, fault-admitting apology, lawyers tended to set all 
three settlement levers higher than when no apology was offered.80  Among 
the three levers, apology was most statistically significant for aspirations and 
less so for judgments.  While reservations followed this pattern, the differ-
ence in reservation after an apology or no apology was not statistically sig-
nificant.81 
Like claimants, lawyers assessed full apologies more positively than 
partial apologies, suggesting that “attorneys and lay people made similar 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Robbennolt, supra note 8, at 362–63. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See supra p. 191. 
 79. Robbennolt, supra note 8, at 370. 
 80. Id. at 376. 
 81. Id. 
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judgments about the relative sufficiency of the different types of apolo-
gies.”82  Another similarity is that both claimants and lawyers associated 
greater evidence of fault with higher expectations of winning at the court-
house.83 
A dissimilarity is the effect of apology on the claimant’s and lawyer’s 
own responses to the incident.  Apology positively impacted claimants in 
areas such as the claimant’s evaluation of the cyclist’s responsibility, the 
claimant’s anger, and the claimant’s inclination to forgive the cyclist.  Apol-
ogy inclined claimants more favorably to the cyclist.  This was not true of 
lawyers, whose evaluations were uninfluenced by apology.84  Perhaps more 
to the point, clients valued the reparative capacity of apologies to reduce an-
ger and to inspire forgiveness; their lawyers were focused on the legal ad-
vantages the apology created. 
This explains why apologies pushed settlement levers for lawyers and 
for clients in opposite directions.  In the wake of an apology, lawyers in-
creased their aspirations and evaluations; for claimants, these numbers de-
creased.  When the lawyers were evaluated by subgroup, plaintiffs’ lawyers’ 
evaluations were only higher when the apology was admissible. 
Robbennolt’s findings are instructive.  Claimants and lawyers both un-
derstand the distinction between the message communicated by a full apolo-
gy from that communicated by a partial apology.  That is, both groups un-
derstood the moral and legal distinction between the full and partial apology.  
Yet Robbennolt noted a significant difference in the effect of the apology on 
critical settlement levers.  The full apology led claimants to reduce aspira-
tions and motivated settlement.  The same apology led lawyers to increase 
aspiration and feel emboldened for trial. 
This value distinction is important for lawyers to understand.  If a law-
yer fails to recognize the value of apology for her client, the lawyer may re-
sist a settlement her client desires, or worse, push for an unwanted trial.  Or, 
as Robbennolt notes, lawyers may “not recognize the importance of clients’ 
demands for apologies . . . and may not, therefore, entirely understand their 
clients’ or opposing clients’ resistance to settlement in the absence of apolo-
gies.”85  This is the kind of misunderstanding that not only invites impasse, 
but also subverts interest-based processes. 
 
 82. Id. at 378. 
 83. Id. at 379. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 381. 
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C. Impact of Apology on Attorney Mediators 
Lawyer mediators may miss the value an apology has to a disputant in 
the same way that a lawyer may miss the value of an apology to her client.86  
This means that lawyer-mediators must be intentional when it comes to ex-
ploring the role of reparative rituals in mediated settings.  Questions regard-
ing the party’s interest in reparative processes should be specifically posed 
so that the lawyer’s inclination to undervalue apology will not eclipse the 
client’s desire for apology.  Awareness of professional biases coupled with a 
plan to address those biases is a safeguard lawyer-mediators should adopt. 
V. PRACTICE POINTS REGARDING APOLOGIES IN MEDIATION87 
It is both a rare privilege and a deep responsibility to participate in rec-
onciliation processes.  Lawyers and mediators must be well versed in apolo-
gy theory and practice, yet, at the same time, be comfortable with the mys-
tery embedded in a process that transcends any theory or praxis.  The 
practice tips I offer here are intended to provide a framework for apologetic 
discourse, yet it is my hope that the framework offered invites a much deep-
er conversation between counsel, client, and mediator. 
A. Claimant’s Counsel 
1. Establish claimant’s particular perspective/understanding of reparative 
processes and the interrelationship among those processes (e.g., does this 
claimant demand repentance as a condition precedent for forgiveness?); 
 
2. Explore claimant’s goals regarding reparative gestures (e.g., are for-
giveness, reconciliation, or both among claimant’s litigation goals?); 
 
3. Educate claimant on the evidentiary implications of reparative expressions 
like apology when offered within a protected environment, including a feed-
back segment in order to ensure claimant understands the evidentiary impli-
cationand, if appropriate, negotiate an unprotected apology;88 
 
 
 86. Id. at 395. 
 87. These practice tips are intentionally limited to this paper’s topic.  They are to be consid-
ered as supplemental to a lawyer’s other responsibilities in guiding a client in mediated contexts. 
 88. By feedback segment, I mean a specific time for the lawyer to learn what the client has 
understood by asking “tell me what you have heard” rather than asking “did you understand what I 
have told you.” 
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4. Recognize that counsel and claimant may interpret and evaluate reparative 
gestures differently; 
 
5. Recognize that impasse may mean a reparative gesture either is needed, 
missed, or has been botched;89 
 
6. Respect the value claimant places on reparative processes; and 
 
7. Document the discussion. 
B. Defense Counsel 
1. Educate defendant on the strategic implications of apology; 
 
2. Educate defendant on the ethical and moral dimensions of apology; 
 
3. Educate defendant on the evidentiary implications of apology; 
 
4. Educate defendant on the distinction between full and partial apologies 
and on how that distinction impacts both claimants and counsel; 
 
5. Guide the defendant in constructing the apology and rehearse the apology 
to be offered;90 
 
6. Respect that a defendant’s need to account for harm caused may trump 
legal caveats, and if the client decides to offer an apology, be sure the risks 
are documented. 
C. Mediator 
1. Explicitly establish the parties’ goals regarding reparative rituals like 
apology; 
 
 89. When a claimant continues to negatively refer to a previous transaction, one should won-
der if the accommodation previously offered is perceived as inadequate by the claimant.  I describe 
this experience as a missed accommodation. 
 90. As already noted, apologies are easy to botch, especially when the party offering the apol-
ogy has ambivalence about the offer. Rehearsing the apology gives the lawyer the opportunity to 
hear precisely what the defendant plans to say.  If the apology is equivocal, then it may be better to 
offer no apology than to offer one that equivocates. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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2. Be self-aware of personal biases, like the inclination of lawyers to under-
value apology and the human tendency to forget the diversity of views re-
garding forgiveness and its antecedents; 
 
3. Establish that all present understand the evidentiary protection of commu-
nications occurring in the ADR environment; 
 
4. Ensure that resolution agreements document the evidentiary impact of re-
parative gestures offered; 
 
5. Obtain education and training about reparative processes, to establish lit-
eracy about and competency in guiding reparative processes; and 
 
6. If an apology is to be offered, invite the defendant to rehearse the apology 
and evaluate whether it meets the claimant’s and the defendant’s litigation 
objectives. 
 
Beyond these practice pointers is an invitation for all those seeking to 
facilitate apologetic discourse and reconciliation processes to develop skills 
and traits not typically taught in law school.  We must learn to be careful and 
reflective listeners, or risk eclipsing the desires of those we are hired to serve 
with our own values and views.  We must also practice patience and humili-
ty, ever mindful that we are participants in the sowing of the seeds of recon-
ciliation, even if we do not witness its fruits. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the past decade, there has been an explosion of interest around apolo-
gy and its role in legal contexts.  In 1999, only two states had laws that ad-
dressed the evidentiary implication of apology.  Today, thirty-seven states 
have such laws.  In 1999, there were only a handful of legal articles analyz-
ing the role of apology in litigation contexts; today there are scores of arti-
cles analyzing apology in economic, biological, psychological, and moral 
terms.  Since 1999, anecdotal and empirical data have accumulated to sug-
gest that apology positively influences settlement decisions by claimants.  
Data also have been presented to suggest that claimants and lawyers value 
apologies differently in settlement negotiationsdata that is critical for 
claimants, lawyers, and mediators to know. 
Clearly, professionals must be aware of apology’s significance as a liti-
gation resourceespecially those engaged in interest-based ADR processes.  
At the same time, they must be cognizant of the ethical and moral dimen-
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sions of apology when understood within a reconciliation sequence.  No-
where does the role of apology hold more potential impact in the legal arena 
than in ADR settings.  This means that people charged with creating educa-
tional programs, especially for those in ADR specialties, must be proactive 
in offering courses that train professionals on apology and its capacity to re-
solveand to transformlitigation. 
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